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INTRODUCTION
Citizens United v. FEC' is one of the most reviled decisions of the Supreme
Court in recent years. The President of the United States denounced the
decision to the Justices' faces at his 2010 State of the Union address. 2 His 20o8
opponent, John McCain, called it the "worst decision ever."3 The Democratic
Party is pledged to reverse it by constitutional amendment if necessary.4
Prominent newspapers attribute to it virtually every excess of the campaign
finance system, whether or not the practices were authorized by the decision or
would have been lawful even without it.5 It has become shorthand for
corporate domination of politics.' It has few defenders among legal scholars.7
1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2. Barack H. Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President in State
of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 201o), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks
-president-state-union-address ("With all due deference to separation of powers, last week
the Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for
special interests-including foreign corporations-to spend without limit in our elections. I
don't think American elections should be bankrolled by America's most powerful interests,
or worse, by foreign entities. They should be decided by the American people. And I'd urge
Democrats and Republicans to pass a bill that helps to correct some of these problems.").
3. Alice Robb, McCain Addresses Oxford, OXONIAN GLOBALIST, Oct. 11, 2012, http://toglobalist
.org/2o12/1o/mccain-addresses-oxford.
4. Moving America Forward: 2012 Democratic National Platform, DEMOCRATIC NAT'L
CONVENTION 12 (2012), http://assets.dstatic.org/dnc-platform/2ol2-National-Platform.pdf
("We support campaign finance reform, by constitutional amendment if necessary.").
5. See, e.g., Editorial, The $6 Billion Presidential Contest, USA TODAY, Nov. 4, 2012, http://
www.usatoday.conVstory/opinion/2ol2/11/o4/presidential-election-6-billion/i681827 ("The
floodgates opened with the Supreme Court's Citizens United ruling in 2010 and a subsequent
lower court decision. Just about every post-Watergate reform has been undermined, and
money is sloshing around this campaign like the waters of Superstorm Sandy."); Editorial,
Expose the Fat Cats, WASH. POST, July 14, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-o7
-14/opinions/35487396-1_secret-money-full-disclosure-fat-cats ("The Supreme Court's 2010
Citizens United decision opened the door to unlimited donations by corporations, wealthy
individuals and labor unions."); Editorial, When Other Voices Are Drowned Out, N.Y.
TiMEs, Mar. 25, 2012, http://www.nytimes.comfV2oi2/o3/26/opinionVwhen-other-voices-are
-drowned-out.html (arguing that the decision was shaped by an "extreme view of the First
Amendment: money equals speech, and independent spending by wealthy organizations
and individuals poses no problem to the political system").
6. See, e.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr., How to Beat Citizens United, WASH. POST, Apr.
22, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.con/2012-o4-22/opinions/35453992_i-contribution
-limits-campaign-finance-law-state-address; Editorial, Occupy Anniversary: The 1 Percent Are





Part of the criticism is well-deserved. The opinion is overly long and
unfocused. It seems to stretch for unnecessarily broad interpretations of free
speech law, beyond what the parties argued or what the facts demanded. On its
own motion, the Court ordered reargument of the case on theories broader
than those put forward by the plaintiffs, entailing the overruling of precedents
that the plaintiffs had sought to distinguish.' The opinion itself was written
with a broad brush, turning its back on several plausible narrower grounds for
decision. At the first oral argument, counsel for Citizens United suggested the
Court resolve the case on statutory grounds, namely that the ninety-minute
documentary was not "express advocacy" under the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act (BCRA).9 At the reargument, Justice Stevens suggested that non-
profit corporations be allowed to broadcast electioneering publications, so long
-public-encampments (stating in a sub-headline the newspaper's view that the Occupy Wall
Street protest movement "should coalesce around reversing Citizens United"); Editorial,
The Wall Between Contractors and Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2012, http://
www.nytimes.conV2ol2/o3/26/opinion/ithe-wall-between-contractors-and-politics.html.
7. For academic criticism, see, for example, Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion
of Coherence, lo9 MICH. L. REv. 581 (2011), which argues that the Court's holding is too
extreme to be consistently and coherently applied; Ronald Dworkin, The "Devastating"
Decision, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 25, 2010, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/200
/feb/25/the-devastating-decision, which calls the decision "appalling"; Lawrence Lessig,
Democracy After Citizens United, Bos. REV., Sept. 4, 2010, http://bostonreview.net/lessig
-democracy-after-citizens-united, which denounces the decision as "First Amendment
Lochnerism"; and Jeffrey Toobin, Bad Judgment, NEW YORKER NEWS DESK (Jan. 22, 2010),
http://www.newyorker.con/online/blogs/newsdesk/2oio/o/campaign-fmance.html, which
argues that the decision was "egregious" and based on "bizarre legal theories." Among the
rare defenders are Floyd Abrams, Protecting the Heart of the First Amendment, Defending
Citizens United, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 193 (2011); Richard A. Epstein, Citizens United v.
FEC: The Constitutional Right that Big Corporations Should Have but Do Not Want, 34 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 639 (2011); Joel M. Gora, The First Amendment ... United, 27 GA. ST. U. L.
REv. 935 (2011); Ilya Shapiro & Caitlyn W. McCarthy, So What if Corporations Aren't People?,
44 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 701 (2011); and John 0. McGinnis, Citizens United-The Most
Important Decision of the Roberts Court, SCOTUSREPORT (July 10, 2012, 9:32 AM),
http://www.scotusreport.con/2012/o7/1o/citizens-united-the-most-important-decision-of
-the-roberts-court.
8. See Citizens United v. FEC, 557 U.S. 932 (2009) (per curiam) (ordering parties to file
supplemental briefs on whether the Court should overrule Austin v. Mich. Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and the part of McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), that
"addresses the facial validity of § 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2
U.S.C. § 4 4 ib (20o6)").
g. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15-19, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. o8-
205), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/08-205.pdf.
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as they were funded only by individual contributions."o Perhaps most
persuasively, it is likely that a pay-per-view offering is not a "broadcast"
communication within the meaning of BCRA- although the advertisements
for the movie presumably were. Instead, the Court embraced a theory with
wider, and perhaps unforeseeable, implications -that speech restrictions
treating some speakers differently from others are suspect." Already the Court
has been forced to cut back on one of the broader possible implications of that
theory, holding that it does not extend to non-citizens." But the most
important flaw - a flaw to which the parties and the lower courts contributed -
was to analyze the case under the wrong clause of the First Amendment.
It is important to underscore that Citizens United was about the production
and dissemination of a documentary film critical of a candidate for office, and
not about contributions to a candidate, party, political organization, or political
action committee (PAC). As Justice Stevens commented in his dissenting
opinion, the "natural textual home" for the right to produce and disseminate a
documentary is the freedom of the press.'3 Whether the government may
forbid publication of opinions about officials and candidates is at the very core
of the Press Clause. To be sure, in recent decades, the Supreme Court has
tended to collapse the various expressive freedoms of the First Amendment
(apart from the Religion Clauses) into an undifferentiated "freedom of
expression," or more often, simply "freedom of speech." 4 But there are
historical and practical reasons why the freedoms of speech, press, assembly,
and petition were separately enumerated.
In the particular context of Citizens United, a focus on freedom of the
press - rather than "speech" more generally - would foster analytical clarity in
two ways. First, it would help to differentiate the act of publishing one's
opinions about a public official or candidate from the act of contributing
1o. Transcript of Oral Reargument at 43-45, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/o8-205[Reargued]
.pdf.
ii. See infra Section II.A.
12. See Bluman v. FEC, 132 S. Ct. 1o87 (2012) (per curiam) (declining to extend the Citizens
United holding to non-citizens).
13. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 431 n.57 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012) (analyzing the
regulation of broadcast media under free speech principles with no mention of freedom of
the press); Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (collapsing expressive
association into public forum analysis); McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985) (holding




money to a candidate or political party. The former is an exercise of freedom of
the press; the latter is not. Second, focusing on freedom of the press would
simplify the analysis as to whether for-profit businesses should be understood
as within the scope of the freedom. Whatever doubts there may be about a
business corporation's right to speak, assemble, petition, exercise religion, or
object to an establishment of religion, there can be little doubt that a business
corporation can operate a newspaper or produce and distribute a film. The vast
majority of the Court's press cases involve for-profit corporations, such as the
New York Times Company or the Cleveland Plain Dealer, and no one, even in
dissent, has ever suggested that corporate status mattered in those cases. 6 I
take that as settled and correct law.
If the Court had analyzed the case under the Press Clause, it could have
avoided muddying the waters of campaign finance law governing
contributions, which presents different constitutional considerations, and it
would have sidestepped the controversy over whether for-profit corporations,
in general, have constitutional rights. Instead, the Court's analysis would have
been confined to the less fraught question of whether the protections of the
Press Clause apply to corporations that are not regularly engaged in the
business of journalism. That is an entirely different question than the ones it
spent so many pages discussing. If the case had been analyzed under the Press
Clause, it should not have been so controversial, and would not have the far-
reaching consequences for campaign finance law that so concern its critics.
Properly analyzed, the decision in Citizens United -though not its reasoning -
is almost incontrovertibly correct.
Unlike some defenders of Citizens United, I am not hostile to efforts to
reform our system of campaign finance, which is a disgrace. I believe the
current system favors incumbents and breeds an unhealthy collaboration
between government and powerful entrenched economic interests, both labor
and corporate, at the expense of small business, ordinary citizens, free
enterprise, and the forces of economic change. I find the majority's sunny
dismissal of the corrupting influence of independent expenditures wholly
unpersuasive. In the past I have proposed campaign finance reforms that
is. The Plain Dealer is owned by Advance Publications, Inc.
16. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., So U.S. 496 (1991); City of Lakewood v.
Plain Dealer Publ'g. Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46 (1988); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596 (1982);
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); N.Y. Times Co. v. Jascalevich, 439
U.S. 1331 (1978); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
417
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
would avoid these pitfalls, serve better to democratize elections, and pass
constitutional muster. 7
This Essay, however, is not about campaign finance reform. It is about the
right to publish criticisms of public officials. It addresses how the facts of
Citizens United would be analyzed under the Press Clause. The argument has
two parts. In Part I, I will argue that long-established principles of freedom of
the press strongly support the conclusion that the organization called Citizens
United had the constitutional right to prepare and disseminate a documentary
critical of a public official and candidate, even during the election season. There
is no serious doubt that some corporations -media corporations -have a
constitutional right under the Press Clause to editorialize about candidates
while the voters are making up their minds. The Supreme Court so held,
without dissent on the merits, in Mills v. Alabama," and neither the Citizens
United dissenters nor any critics of that decision dispute either the reasoning or
the result of Mills. With that backdrop, the dispositive question becomes
whether the protections of the Press Clause are confined to a certain set of
actors, namely the institutional press (however defined), or whether it protects
an activity: publishing information and opinions to the general public. Only if
the former, narrower, interpretation is valid can Citizens United be wrongly
decided. Although the narrow interpretation has received some support in
recent years,' 9 and Justice Stevens appears to embrace it in one sentence and a
footnote in his Citizens United dissent,20 it is in conflict with the great weight of
precedent, 2' departs from the unequivocal historical meaning of the Clause
both before and for more than a hundred years after its enactment,22 and-
perhaps most decisively- requires a legally enforceable line between "press"
and others, which is inherently unworkable and probably would not even
produce a different result in Citizens United itself.23
17. See Michael W. McConnell, A Constitutional Campaign Finance Plan, WALL ST. J., Dec. ii,
1997, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1227044o2303138515.html; Michael W. McConnell,
Redefine Campaign Finance 'Reform,' CHI. TRIB., June 29, 1993, http://articles.chicagotribune
.con/1993-o6-2 9 /news/ 9 3 o6290 3 o 5 _I-reform-limits-and-public-financing-incumbents.
18. 384 U.S. 214 (1966); see infra Part I.
19. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
zo. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 431 & n-57 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
21. See infra Subsection I.C.i.
22. See infra Subsection I.C.2.




Part II briefly explores the implications of deciding the case this way for
campaign finance reform more generally. The freedom of the press rationale
for Citizens United would confine its effect to the right of groups to publish
their own views about candidates and would not extend to contributions,
which would continue to be governed by the somewhat illogical and
counterproductive rules of Buckley v. Valeo. 4 The Press Clause rationale would
provide no occasion for the majority's broader holding prohibiting all speaker-
based distinctions, which would seem to portend invalidation of long-standing
laws prohibiting corporate contributions to campaigns. Indeed, the freedom of
the press rationale provides a more solid basis for the Buckley distinction than
Buckley itself provided. Nonetheless, reformers might well wish to question
whether the distinction between contributions and independent expenditures
does more harm than good, and explore other avenues for improving
the system.
I. THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS PROTECTS THE RIGHT OF A GROUP
LIKE CITIZENS UNITED TO PRODUCE AND DISTRIBUTE A
DOCUMENTARY CRITICIZING A PUBLIC OFFICIAL
A. The Citizens United Decision
Under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA),2 s it is illegal
for corporations or labor unions to use their own funds to broadcast their
opinions for or against candidates for public office within sixty days of the
election.26 Citizens United is a non-profit corporation, which receives a (small)
portion of its funding from for-profit corporations.2 7 It produced a
documentary film criticizing then-Senator Hillary Clinton and disseminated
the film while she was a candidate for President of the United States.
Anticipating that the Federal Election Commission (FEC) would bring charges
and impose penalties, Citizens United sought declaratory and injunctive relief
on the ground that its conduct was protected by the First Amendment.
24. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
25. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Star. 81 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28
U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.).
26. 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (2012).
27. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
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In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, a five-Justice majority of the Supreme
Court ruled in favor of Citizens United. Focusing on the fact that BCRA bans
political speech by some entities (corporations and labor unions) and not
others (individuals, unincorporated groups, PACs, news media, etc.), the
Court decided the case on the basis of the "principle ... that the Government
may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate
identity.""* The Court concluded that the government's proffered justifications
-anti-distortion, 2 9 anti-corruption, 3o and shareholder-protection 3' -failed the
strict scrutiny demanded of speaker-based restrictions. The Court reaffirmed
the distinction between contributions and independent expenditures, first
propounded in Buckley v. Valeo,32 and solidified Buckley's more tentative
conclusion that independent expenditures do not present the serious dangers
of corruption presented by contributions.33
The four-Justice dissent, written by Justice Stevens, was a full-throated
eighty-six page rebuttal of the majority's approach and reasoning, particularly
the majority's "conceit that corporations must be treated identically to natural
persons in the political sphere."3 The dissent did not offer a theory as to which
constitutional rights-or even which First Amendment or Speech Clause
rights-may be exercised by corporations and which may not. The dissent
maintained that BCRA is not truly a ban on speech, and defended the
government's anti-distortion, anti-corruption, and shareholder-protection
rationales as sufficient to justify restrictions on corporate expenditures."
The decision was greeted by a torrent of abuse, much of it of the bumper-
sticker variety. Serious analysis requires us to go beyond the overblown
abstractions that have dominated popular discussion. The outcome of Citizens
a8. Id. at 365; see id. at 394 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The basic
premise underlying the Court's ruling is its iteration, and constant reiteration, of the
proposition that the First Amendment bars regulatory distinctions based on a speaker's
identity, including its 'identity' as a corporation.").
29. Id. at 349-56 (majority opinion).
30. Id. at 356-61.
31. Id. at 361-62.
32. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
33. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357 ("lW]e now conclude that independent expenditures,
including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of
corruption.").
34. Id. at 394 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).




United, for example, did not turn on whether corporations are people.3' They
are not. Corporations are, however, associations of people vested with legal
personality for many purposes. They routinely exercise many constitutional
rights, including under the First Amendment. Moreover, although the First
Amendment rights of petition and assembly are explicitly limited to "the
people," the freedoms of speech and press are not.37
Nor did the case turn on whether "money is speech."38 It is not. But we
need to use things, including money (and paper, and sidewalks, and
telephones, and shoe leather), to make our views known, and governmental
restrictions on the use of resourcesfor the purpose ofcommunicating a message are
properly understood as restrictions on speech. If the city council passed an
ordinance forbidding anyone to use the subway to attend a protest
demonstration, no one would defend the ordinance on the ground that
"subways are not speech." Laws prohibiting the use of certain things to enable
speech are restrictions on speech.
Turning to more serious issues, proper analysis of the Citizens United
problem does not really hinge on whether independent expenditures by self-
interested actors in support of or opposition to candidates for office may be
corrupting (to which the answer should be "yes"),39 or whether the
36. See id. at 466 ("[C]orporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no
desires. Corporations help structure and facilitate the activities of human beings, to be sure,
and their 'personhood' often serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves
members of 'We the People' by whom and for whom our Constitution was established.");
David Kairys, Money Isn't Speech and Corporations Aren't People, SLATE (Jan. 22, 2010,
6:03 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news and-politics/jurisprudence/2obo/oi/money
isnt-speech-andcorporations arent_people.html ("Kennedy depends on two legal
theories that blossomed as constitutional principles in the mid-1970s: money is speech and
corporations are people. Both theories are strange, if not simply wrongheaded .... .").
37. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.").
38. Editorial, Justice Alito, Citizens United and the Press, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.con/2012/11/2o/opinion/justice-alito-citizens-united-and-the
-press.html (criticizing "the false equivalence of money and speech put forward by Citizens
United"); Toobin, supra note 7 (criticizing the opinion's "bizarre legal theories that (1)
corporations have the same rights as human beings, and (2) spending money is the same
thing as speaking").
3g. Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243, 244 (2010) ("Citizens United
reinforces and depends upon the greatest absurdity of campaign finance law-that
independent expenditures pose no threat of campaign finance corruption.").
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government may regulate speech in order to prevent what those in power
regard as "distortion" of public discourse (to which the answer should be
"no").40 The sole question properly presented was whether a group outside the
news industry is constitutionally entitled to disseminate to the public through
mass communications media a commentary about a candidate for public office
within a certain number of days before an election. That is a much more
narrowly focused question.
B. The Analogy to Mills v. Alabama
I begin my analysis with Mills v. Alabama,4' an uncontroversial case from
the 1960s, which-like Citizens United-involved the government's attempt to
punish the publication of criticisms of candidates for office during the period
immediately before an election. The parties in Citizens United largely
overlooked Mills and the Court did not mention it,42 though two amicus curiae
briefs, one written by renowned press lawyer Floyd Abrams and one by the
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, cited and relied on it.4s Despite
40. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 989, 990 (2011) ("[B]oth the Citizens United prime dissenter and plaintiff [have]
described the decision in terms of its effect on political equality .... ); Suzanna Sherry, The
Four Pillars of Constitutional Doctrine, 32 CARDozo L. REV. 969, 1005 (2011) ("Whether
[Citizens United] also embodies sound principles of constitutional aspiration and human
understanding depends on examining the deeper premises on which it rests: that
corporations are entitled to First Amendment protection, that campaign expenditures are
equivalent to speech, and that the government may not 'equalize' citizens' voices.").
41. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
42. The only merits brief of a party citing Mills was the FEC's supplemental reply brief. In it,
the government observed that the Court had "previously upheld federal and state
electioneering restrictions that distinguish[ed] between media commentary and other
corporate electoral advocacy" and cited Mills for its recognition of the "special role" of the
press. Supplemental Reply Brief for the Appellee at 1o, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310
(2010) (No. 08-205). As will become clear, that is an unwarranted reading of the case. See
infra notes 86-98 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has cited Mills as support for
the opposite proposition- that there is no special constitutional privilege for the
institutional press that does not extend to pamphleteers and other nonprofessional
disseminators of opinion. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704-05 (1972) ("The press
in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of
information and opinion." (quoting Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) and
citing, inter alia, Mills, 384 U.S. at 219)).
43. Brief for Senator Mitch McConnell as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2-3, Citizens
United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205) (written by Floyd Abrams); Supplemental Brief for the




this neglect, it is the closest case to Citizens United as a factual matter. I begin
with Mills not out of stare decisis fetishism-as if a single, largely forgotten
decision should "govern" the outcome -but because I believe almost all readers
will agree it was correctly decided and correctly reasoned. My method is to
begin from the uncontroversial common ground represented by this old case,
isolate the respects in which Citizens United is factually different, and explore
whether those differences warrant a denial of constitutional protection to the
Citizens United documentary.
Mills involved the Alabama Corrupt Practices Act,44 which made it a crime
"to do any electioneering or to solicit any votes . . . for or against the election or
nomination of any candidate, or in support of or in opposition to any
proposition that is being voted on on the day on which the election affecting
such candidates or propositions is being held."45 The purpose of the law,
according to the state courts, was to "protect[] the public from confusive [sic]
last-minute charges and countercharges and the distribution of propaganda in
an effort to influence voters on an election day; when as a practical matter,
because of lack of time, such matters cannot be answered or their truth
determined until after the election is over."4" The Birmingham Post-Herald,
which was owned by a corporation,47 violated the law. It published an editorial
on election day denouncing the Mayor, who was running for reelection, and
urging support for a proposition creating an alternative structure of city
government.48 The editor was prosecuted, and the state supreme court upheld
the law.49 The United States Supreme Court held that the ordinance violated
the freedom of the press. Justice Black wrote for the Court:
1, 8-9, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205). Abrams began his brief with a discussion
of the case, noting that a citation of the unanimous ruling in Mills "should suffice" to decide
the case.
44. 17 ALA. CODE § 268-86 (1940).
45. Id. § 285.
46. Mills, 384 U.S. at 219-20 (quoting State v. Mills, 176 So. 2d 884, 890 (Ala. 1965)).
47. See Birmingham Post Co. v. Sturgeon, 149 So. 74, 75 (Ala. 1933) ("The defendant, The
Birmingham Post, is a corporation engaged in the business of publishing and distributing
newspapers."); Birmingham Post Co. v. Montgomery, 176 So. 375, 375 (Ala. Ct. App. 1937)
(referring to "the single appellant Birmingham Post Company, a corporation").
48. Fittingly, perhaps, the editorial also accused the Mayor of "propos[ing] to set himself up as
news censor at City Hall." Editorial, Do We Need Further Warning?, BIRMINGHAM POST-
HERALD, Nov. 6, 1962, reprinted in Mills, 176 So. 2d at 886.
49. Mills, 176 So. 2d 884.
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The Constitution specifically selected the press, which includes not only
newspapers, books, and magazines, but also humble leaflets and
circulars, to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs.
Thus the press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote
to any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a
constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people
responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve.
Suppression of the right of the press to praise or criticize governmental
agents and to clamor and contend for or against change, which is all
that this editorial did, muzzles one of the very agencies the Framers of
our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our
society and keep it free. The Alabama Corrupt Practices Act by
providing criminal penalties for publishing editorials such as the one
here silences the press at a time when it can be most effective. It is
difficult to conceive of a more obvious and flagrant abridgment of the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press.50
If Mills was correctly decided, what does that say about Citizens United?
According to the Court, "[i]t is difficult to conceive of a more obvious and
flagrant abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press"
than to outlaw dissemination of a critique of a candidate during the "time
when it can be most effective."s' That seems to describe BCRA no less than the
Alabama Corrupt Practices Act, and the anti-Hillary Clinton documentary no
less than the anti-Mayor editorial. But there are factual distinctions between
the two cases:
1. Citizens United is a non-profit corporation, while the Birmingham
Post-Herald was a for-profit corporation;
2. Citizens United involved a film documentary, while Mills involved a
newspaper;
3. BCRA prohibits the publication of opinions about candidates
within sixty days of the election, while the Alabama Corrupt
Practices Act did so only for the day of the election;
So. Mills, 384 U.S. at 219 (citing Lovell v. City ofGriffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), for the proposition






4. BCRA permits regulated parties to publish commentaries on
candidates if they establish separate funds for that purpose and do
not use their own money, while the Alabama Corrupt Practices Act
did not; and
5. Citizens United is not a "media corporation" within the definition
in BCRA, while the Birmingham Post-Herald, a newspaper, was a
classic member of the institutional press.
There is no difference in one important respect: the editorialists in both cases
were corporations. Surely the first four differences have no legal significance.
Only the last raises any real doubts.
First, for purposes of freedom of the press, it does not matter whether the
publisher of a newspaper, magazine, or documentary makes a profit on the
publication. One of the Court's earliest cases elaborating on the constitutional
privilege announced in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan52 involved a non-profit
ideological organization- namely, the John Birch Society-which published a
magazine allegedly defamatory of a public official.53 Notwithstanding the John
Birch Society's ideological motivation for publishing the magazine and its non-
profit status, the Court held that it was a "media defendant" for purposes of
constitutional protection against libel suits brought by public figures.- Even
earlier, the Court had narrowly construed the Federal Corrupt Practices Act not
to cover a weekly periodical published by a labor union, which endorsed
candidates for office, out of concern that this would be unconstitutional. 55 The
parallels to Citizens United's documentary are evident.
More fundamentally, because the Press Clause forbids the licensing of the
press, it follows that the government has no authority to condition the right to
publish on the financial structure or source of funds of an organization56 "No
licensing" means no limitation on who can exercise the freedom. Some of the
nation's leading journals, which surely qualify for freedom of the press, lose
money and are supported in significant part by the contributions of supporters
52. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
53. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
54. Id.
ss. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 121 (1948).
S6. This suggests that the government's attempt in oral argument to claim that it was not
"banning" speech but regulating how it may be funded was beside the point, if the case is
analyzed under the Press Clause.
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or a corporate backer. These include National Review, 57 The Nation,ss The
Weekly Standard,59 First Things,o The Washington Times,"' Slate,62 and Salon.3
Newsweek magazine apparently survived for its final year of print publication
on the resources of its owner, the spouse of a Democratic politician.6 4 It would
be shocking to think that any of these publications could be told to be silent
about candidates for two months before an election, merely because they do
not turn a profit. Perhaps significantly, in its deliberations over a proposed
"press shield" bill, the Senate Judiciary Committee recently rejected any
limitation of the protection to professional or to profit-making journalistic
businesses.6 s
57. Gary Shapiro, An 'Encounter' with Conservative Publishing, N.Y. SUN, Dec. 9,
2005, http://www.nysun.com/on-the-town/encounter-with-conservative-publishing/24259
(noting that the magazine "had lost about $25 million over 50 years" and was reliant on the
funding of private donors).
s8. See Mattathias Schwartz, Unconventional Wisdom, SALON, June 9, 2005, http://www.salon
.comIV2oo5/o6/o9/navasky (noting The Nation's previous financial struggles and dependence
on private investors).
59. Dirk Smillie, The Stealth Media Mogul, FORBES, June 29, 20o9, http://www.forbes.com
/2009/o6/28/anschutz-weekly-standard-business-media-examiner.html (estimating that
The Weekly Standard loses $S million annually).
6o. First Things is published by the Institute on Religion and Public Life, a S01(c)(3)
organization. Donate, FIRST THINGS, http://www.firstthings.comVdonate (last visited
Sept. 2, 2013).
61. Dante Chinni, The Other Paper, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 47
(estimating that the founder of the Unification Church, which owns the paper, had spent
nearly $2 billion running the paper).
62. Nick Summers, Jacob Weisberg Was a Web Pioneer. But He Doesn't Much Care for What
Works on the Web Now. Can Slate Recover?, N.Y. OBSERVER (Nov. 10, 2010),
http://observer.con/2oo/i1/jacob-weisberg-was-a-web-pioneer-but-he-doesnt-much-care
-for-what-works-on-the-web-now-can-slate-recover (quoting the editor of Slate, David
Plotz, as reporting that "Slate is not a profitable magazine").
63. Russell Adams, Salon.com Opens Parlor to Possible Partner, WAIL ST. J., Nov. 28,
2010, http://online.wsj.con/article/SB000144o527487o45632o45764o921476693184.html
(noting a loss of more than $15 million over five years).
64. Tanzina Vega & Jeremy W. Peters, An Audio Pioneer Buys Newsweek, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2,
20io, http://www.nytimes.com/2o io/o8/o3/business/media/03newsweek.html (noting that
the magazine lost $30 million in 2009 and was sold for $i and an agreement to assume the
magazine's $50 million of liabilities).
6s. S. 987, 113th Cong. § 11(2) (2013); see Kurt Wimmer & Jeff Kosseff, Senate Judiciary





Moreover, if the for-profit or non-profit status of the entity that distributes
a publication does matter, under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, non-
profit advocacy groups have greater - not fewer - rights to make expenditures
that would affect elections. That is the teaching of FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, Inc.6 If a for-profit corporation like the Birmingham Post Company
has a constitutional right to run an editorial that might influence an election, it
would be strange to say that a non-profit publication does not.
The difference in medium of communication also surely is irrelevant.
Despite initial uncertainty, films have long been held to enjoy full First
Amendment protection.67 No party or amicus in the Citizens United litigation
suggested that the cinematic character of the medium made any difference to
the constitutional analysis.6 ' During the first oral argument in the case, Deputy
Solicitor General Malcolm Stewart told the Court that the government's
constitutional theory would apply to books containing criticisms or
endorsements of candidateS69 -a startling admission that may have
contributed to the call for reargument. 70 During the reargument, Solicitor
General Elena Kagan resisted the books hypothetical71 but admitted that the
("[T]he bill's protections are not limited to people who produce journalism for financial
gain.").
66. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
67. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (holding that films are protected by the
First Amendment and overturning the Court's decision in Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Corm'n
ofOhio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915)). It is perhaps worth noting that the distributor of the film in
Burstyn was a corporation, a fact the Court did not treat as having any legal significance.
68. It mattered to the definition of electioneering under the statute, and to the applicability of
the statutory exception for media corporations, which will be considered below, but not to
the constitutional analysis.
69. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 29-30.
70. See Adam Liptak, Justices Seem Skeptical of Scope of Campaign Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25,
2009, http://www.nytimes.conV2oo9/o3/25/washingtorV25scotus.html ("Several of the
court's more conservative justices reacted with incredulity to a series of answers from a
government lawyer about the scope of Congressional authority to limit political speech. The
lawyer, Malcolm L. Stewart, said Congress has the power to ban political books, signs and
Internet videos, if they are paid for by corporations and distributed not long before an
election.").
i. Transcript of Oral Reargument, supra note io, at 65-66 ("We went back, we considered the
matter carefully, and the government's view is that although 441b does cover full-length
books, that there would be [a] quite good as-applied challenge to any attempt to apply 44xb
in that context. And I should say that the FEC has never applied 44ib in that context. So for
60 years a book has never been at issue.").
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government's constitutional theory would embrace pamphlets.72 Because
pamphlets were a principal medium of political advocacy at the time of
adoption of the First Amendment, this was not a comforting reformulation. As
the technology for dissemination of ideas and opinions to the public has
advanced, from the printing press to radio to television to film to the internet,
blogs, Twitter, and video games, the Supreme Court has quite properly (in my
opinion) extended the principle of freedom of the press to the various media
for the dissemination of opinion and information to the general public.73 I
doubt many critics of Citizens United are critical on this point. So the fact that
the case involved a film instead of a newspaper should not lead to a different
result.
The differences in duration of the blackout period- sixty days versus one
day -likewise could not support a different outcome. If anything, the sixty-day
period in Citizens United is more speech-restrictive than the one-day period at
issue in Mills, and ought to be more suspect. Note that neither BCRA nor the
Alabama Corrupt Practices Act is a content-neutral time, place, or manner
regulation; the laws are directed only at a particular subject matter, namely the
qualities of candidates for office or, in the case of the Alabama statute,
candidates or propositions. But even if they were content-neutral, it would be
72. Id. at 66 ("[CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:] [I]f you say that you are not going to apply it to a
book, what about a pamphlet? GENERAL KAGAN: I think a-a pamphlet would be different.
A pamphlet is pretty classic electioneering, so there is no attempt to say that 441 b only
applies to video and not to print.").
73. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (extending "First Amendment
protection" to video games and noting that "whatever the challenges of applying the
Constitution to ever-advancing technology, the basic principles of freedom of speech and
the press, like the First Amendment's command, do not vary when a new and different
medium for communication appears" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (concluding that "our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level
of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the Internet]"); United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) ("We have no doubt that moving
pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed
by the First Amendment."); see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364 ("Rapid changes in
technology-and the creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expression- counsel
against upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers.
Today, 30-second television ads may be the most effective way to convey a political message.
Soon, however, it may be that Internet sources, such as blogs and social networking Web
sites, will provide citizens with significant information about political candidates and
issues." (citations omitted)). I have doubts that the Court was correct in Brown to extend
full First Amendment protection to the marketing to minors of violent interactive games, in
which the gamer engages in simulated conduct that is not communicative (except, maybe, to




difficult to claim that the sixty-day blackout period imposed by BCRA
permitted alternative avenues for the expression superior to the one-day period
imposed by the Corrupt Practices Act. Both statutes "silence[] the press at a
time when it can be most effective," as the Court observed in its opinion
in Mills.74
A fourth difference is that BCRA allows the regulated entities to publish
editorials if they form separate funds (PACs), which could raise money from
friends and supporters to pay for the publication. 75 The Alabama Corrupt
Practices Act contained no such exemption. Even if it had, however, this would
not have altered the result in Mills. It is not possible for a newspaper to run its
editorials under a separate organizational authority. A newspaper, like other
First Amendment entities, is entitled to speak in its own name, with its own
reputation and its own resources.76 Other groups, similarly, are permitted to
exercise First Amendment rights without having to solicit contributions from
third parties.
C. Media Organizations
That brings us to the only potentially significant difference: that Citizens
United is not part of the journalism profession. That fact might matter-if the
Press Clause confines its protection to organs of professional journalism. If the
Press Clause is so confined, then it might be constitutional to prohibit non-
journalists from publishing their views on candidates during the election cycle,
even though members of the institutional press enjoy the right to do so under a
clause that applies only to them. This is the only logical way to square
opposition to the result in Citizens United with the uncontroversial First
Amendment right of corporate-owned newspapers to run editorials endorsing
or opposing candidates in the days before an election. If Mills is right - which
seems uncontroversial - the only way Citizens United can be wrong is if the
Press Clause protects the right of the "news media" (however defined) to
disseminate their opinions of candidates during the election season, and no one
else. This seems to be the constitutional vision of the Congress that enacted
BCRA, if it had one.
74. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966).
75. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 415 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
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Despite the length of their opinions, the Justices devoted surprisingly little
attention to this seemingly dispositive question. 7 To be sure, the majority
briefly asserted that the institutional press has no more rights under the Press
Clause than others, but it offered no real explanation or justification. As one
commentator noted, the assertion was "almost offhanded," "offer[ing]
virtually no substantive discussion of the reasons for this conclusion."7 The
similarly lengthy dissent took the opposite view, but with no more explanation.
Indeed, the dissent's treatment of this issue was confined to one conclusory
sentence accompanied by a short footnote,79 to which Justice Scalia's
concurrence responded with a slightly longer footnote.so It is particularly
strange that the dissent made so little of the issue, since the special
constitutional status of the institutional press provides the only logical theory
under which the majority could be wrong (assuming Mills is right). Long
passages in the dissenting opinion read as if the dissenters believe that
corporations have no constitutional rights at all, or at least no free speech
rights, but it is extraordinarily improbable that the dissenters believe that
corporations have no Press Clause rights. Surely the New York Times
Company enjoys Press Clause rights, even though it is a corporation.
The entirety of the dissenters' analysis appears in footnote 57, which I
quote in full:
In fact, the Free Press Clause might be turned against Justice Scalia, for
two reasons. First, we learn from it that the drafters of the First
Amendment did draw distinctions -explicit distinctions - between
types of "speakers," or speech outlets or forms. Second, the Court's
strongest historical evidence all relates to the Framers' views on the
press, yet while the Court tries to sweep this evidence into the Free
Speech Clause, the Free Press Clause provides a more natural textual
home. The text and history highlighted by our colleagues suggests why
one type of corporation, those that are part of the press, might be able
to claim special First Amendment status, and therefore why some kinds
of "identity"-based distinctions might be permissible after all. Once one
77. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 352-54.
78. Randall P. Bezanson, Whither Freedom ofthe Press?, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1263 (2012).
79. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 431 fl57 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).




accepts that much, the intellectual edifice of the majority opinion
crumbles."'
If Justice Stevens is correct that the Free Press Clause "might" single out "one
type of corporation, those that are part of the press" for "special First
Amendment status," he would be correct that "the intellectual edifice of the
majority opinion crumbles."" Unfortunately, he provides no support in
precedent or history for that proposition, and does not explain how the
distinction would work in practice, or even how it would apply in this case.
The notion that the Press Clause might protect only a certain class of
businesses, namely those in the business of purveying news and opinion, is not
crazy. Some thoughtful legal figures, Justice Potter Stewart most prominently
among them,3 have urged this view, as have organizations such as the
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, which represent the
institutional interests of the journalism profession.4 The Supreme Court,
however, has never accepted this view and has often rejected it,"s and it
presents seemingly insurmountable historical and pragmatic difficulties. To
decide Citizens United in favor of the FEC on this ground-the only available
logical ground-would have required a departure from established law, and
certainly more than a conclusory footnote.
81. Id. at 431 n.57 (Stevens, J., concurning in part and dissenting in part).
82. Id.
83. See Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 635 (1975) ("None of us-as
individuals -has a 'free speech' right to refuse to tell a grand jury the identity of someone
who has given us information relevant to the grand jury's legitimate inquiry. Only if
a reporter is a representative of a protected institution does the question become a
different one.").
84. See Supplemental Brief for the Reporters Committee, supra note 43, at 12.
85. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 n.8 (2001) (drawing "no distinction" between
the media and non-media respondents in a case about the disclosure of illegally intercepted
communications); First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782 (1978) (noting that
"the press does not have a monopoly on either the First Amendment or the ability to
enlighten"); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 364 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("[T]he purpose of the Constitution was not to erect the press into a privileged institution
but to protect all persons in their right to print what they will as well as to utter it.");
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, nM (1943) (referring, in a case about Jehovah's
Witnesses, to "[t]he right to use the press for expressing one's views"); Lovell v. City of
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) ("The press in its historic connotation comprehends every
sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion."); Associated Press
v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937) ("The publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity
from the application of general laws.").
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1. Precedent
Again we begin with Mills v. Alabama, a decision that preceded the
controversy over campaign finance reform. In Mills, the Court recited the then-
standard position that "the press," within the meaning of the First
Amendment, "includes not only newspapers, books, and magazines, but also
humble leaflets and circulars.""6 For this proposition, the opinion cited Lovell v.
City of Griffn.7 The defendant in Lovell was a Jehovah's Witness who was
prosecuted and fined for handing out religious tracts on city sidewalks in
violation of a city ordinance. Interestingly, her lawyers, who were among the
leading civil liberties lawyers of the day," invoked the freedom of the press and
the free exercise of religion, and did not think to mention freedom of speech.
The Court noted that the ordinance applied across the board to "circulars,
handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind," and commented that
although newspapers would appear to come within its language, the record did
not indicate whether the ordinance had ever been applied to newspapers.8" The
Court then proceeded to strike the ordinance down on its face, meaning in all
of its applications. This necessarily included circulars, advertising, and
literature other than newspapers, meaning other than the products of the
institutional press. Chief Justice Hughes wrote for a unanimous Court:
The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals.
It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These indeed have been
historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas
Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest. The press in its
historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which
affords a vehicle of information and opinion.90
As Justice Frankfurter stated in a concurring opinion in another case: "[T]he
purpose of the Constitution was not to erect the press into a privileged
86. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966).
87. 303 U.S. 444.
88. Lovell was represented by Olin R. Moyle, who argued ten Supreme Court cases from 1937 to
1939, and future Attorney General Francis Biddle represented the amicus ACLU.
89. Lovell, 303 U.S. at 450.




institution but to protect all persons in their right to print what they will as
well as to utter it."9' No Supreme Court decision has ever held otherwise.
According to the leading recent article on this subject, by Professor Eugene
Volokh, it was not until the 1970s that some courts - all of them lower courts -
for the first time extended special protections under the Press Clause to the
institutional press, and these decisions remained a minority. 92 At the Supreme
Court level, although some individual Justices - Stewart, Douglas, and now
Stevens and his fellow Citizens United dissenters -have flirted with the idea
that the institutional press has superior rights under the Clause, 93 this view has
never commanded a majority. Based on some combination of history and
workability, Court majorities have rejected the idea of constitutional special
protections for the journalism business in the context of libel law,94 reporters'
privilege, 95 access to judicial proceedings,96 searches of newspaper offices,97
antitrust,98 invasions of privacy,99 and employment discrimination."oo The
gi. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 364 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
92. Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? From the
Framing to Today, 16o U. PA. L. REV. 459, 522-23 (2012).
93. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, S8 U.S. 310, 431 & n.57 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721-34 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Stewart, supra note 83, at 635.
94. The Supreme Court has repeatedly applied the actual malice standard of New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan to non-media defendants. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968)
(applying the standard to a candidate for public office); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75
(1966) (applying the standard to a newspaper contributor); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964) (applying the standard to the newspaper and its non-media co-defendants).
9s. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690 (denying the reporter's privilege in the context of grand jury
investigations).
g6. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577 n.12 (1980) (grounding the public's
right of access to court proceedings in the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly); see also
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (refusing to recognize a special right of access
to prisons).
97. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 563-67 (1978).
9s. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1945).
9g. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 n.8 (2001) (drawing "no distinction" between the
media and non-media respondents in a case about the disclosure of illegally intercepted
communications).
ioo. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973).
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Court permits legislatures to pass special laws protecting the journalism
business, but it has not interpreted the First Amendment to require them."o'
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"o2 the most iconic of all free press decisions,
offers powerful support for this conclusion. In Sullivan, a group of ministers
and civil rights activists (not journalists) placed a paid advertisement in a
newspaper, which was itself a corporation, criticizing the conduct of a local
official.o 3 The official sued both the newspaper corporation and the individuals
for libel. The Supreme Court granted separate petitions for certiorari filed by
the individuals and the company, and held that the "freedom of speech and of
the press" extends to both sets of defendants, and does so in the same way.104
The Court addressed and rejected the argument that the message was not
entitled to full protection because it appeared in a paid advertisement, rather
than the news or commentary section of the newspaper, calling the distinction
"immaterial." 0 5 The Court explained that to deny constitutional protection to
paid advertisements containing information and commentary on public
officials "might shut off an important outlet for the promulgation of
information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have access to
publishing facilities-who wish to exercise their freedom of speech even
though they are not members of the press.""o' It might have been more precise
to say that these persons who are "not members of the press" nevertheless can
exercise the "freedom of the press"-as the historical sources'07 and
precedentsos the Court cited put it-but Sullivan provided no occasion to tease
out the differences, if any, between the rights. The Sullivan Court consistently
1o. In this respect, there are some, albeit inexact, parallels to the way the Court has construed
the Free Exercise Clause. See Bezanson, supra note 78, at 1268.
102. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
103. The advertisement did not actually mention the official by name, but the courts below
concluded that the reference to him was sufficiently evident to warrant his suit.
104. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265-66.
105. Id. at 266.
106. Id.
107. The Court relied on the successful opposition to the Sedition Act led by Madison and
Jefferson. In this section of the opinion, both the quoted sources and the Court's own
restatements refer to "the freedom of the press." Id. at 275-77.
1o8. Id. at 266. The Court cited Lovell v. City of Grffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), which as we have
seen treated pamphleteering as an exercise of the freedom of the press, and Schneider v. New




referred to the relevant right as "the freedom of speech and of the press,"' 09
with two references to the "freedom of expression,""o thus obviating the need
to address any differences. The bottom line was that the publication of
criticism of a public official is protected whether published by a for-profit
media corporation or by persons who are "not members of the press" in the
form of a paid advertisement. That covers both bases of the Citizens United
problem: the freedom to publish criticisms of public officials and candidates is
not lost by virtue of either corporate status or non-membership in the
institutional news media.
2. History
This interpretation of the reach of the Press Clause is consistent with its
history."' The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.""' The verb "abridging,"
coupled with the definite article "the," indicates that the framers of the
Amendment believed there was something called "the freedom of the press,"
which antedated the Amendment. Whether that freedom should be given a
narrow, British, Blackstonian construction, as some of the Federalists urged in
the 1790s, or whether it should be given a broader, Americanized, Whiggish
construction, as Jefferson and others argued, need not detain us for the present
purposes, for there was no apparent disagreement between these camps over
who is protected by the freedom. Blackstone described the liberty of the press as
the "undoubted right" of "[e]very freeman" to "lay what sentiments he pleases
1o. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 268 ("The question before us is whether this rule of liability, as applied
to an action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct, abridges the
freedom of speech and of the press that is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.").
11o. Id. at 269, 271-72. The Court also quotes from a lecture given by Justice Douglas on the
freedom of expression. See id. at 302 (quoting W nIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE
PEOPLE 41 (1958)).
iii. I lean heavily on Volokh's article, supra note 92, in this section of this Essay. Professor
Randall Bezanson has criticized Volokh's article, contending on non-historical grounds that
there remains a need for a separate constitutional law of freedom of the press, aside from
freedom of speech. See Bezanson, supra note 78, at 1262-63. But neither Bezanson nor any
other scholar, as of now, has cast doubt on Volokh's historical research or located any
contrary sources. See id. at 1261 ("Professor Volokh, of course, is exactly right when judged
by the spare and spartan doctrine of textualism and originalism.").
112. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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before the public."113 The Jeffersonians agreed. The author of a book-length
commentary on the Constitution, Jeffersonian legal scholar St. George
Tucker, 14 wrote that "the freedom of the press" means that "[e]very
individual, certainly, has a right to speak, or publish, his sentiments on the
measures of government."" 5 The author of the first major constitutional
treatise, a Federalist, Chancellor James Kent, took the same position: "every
citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments.""' Joseph Story
agreed, describing the freedom of the press in these terms: "every man shall
have a right to speak, write, and print his opinions upon any subject
whatsoever, without any prior restraint."'17 So did state constitutions and state
supreme courts."' Anyone who went to a printer and paid him to print a
pamphlet or book, or placed an advertisement in a publication, was entitled to
exercise the freedom. There were no apparent dissenters from this proposition
in the decades before or after the First Amendment.1 9
This near-universal assertion of the broad right of "every citizen" to publish
his sentiments is unsurprising, since at the time of the founding there were no
professional journalists in the modern sense of the word. Much of the editorial
content of newspapers was written by lawyers, farmers, schoolteachers,
ministers, statesmen, and other citizens who were not journalists. The
Federalist- written by three non-journalists and published in New York
newspapers as occasional essays -is the most famous example, but there were
113. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151. The disagreement between some Federalists
and most Jeffersonians was over the scope of subsequent punishment for libelous or
seditious speech, not over who enjoyed the right.
114. On the importance of Tucker's work, see Charles T. Cullen, St. George Tucker, John
Marshall, and Constitutionalism in the Post-Revolutionary South, 32 VAND. L. REv. 341, 341-43
(1979); and Davison M. Douglas, Foreword: The Legacy of St. George Tucker, 47 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1111, 1113 (20o6).
115. 2 HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BIACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE,
TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES;
AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. at 28-29 (Philadelphia, William Young Birch
& Abraham Small 1803).
116. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTAIUES ON AMERICAN LAW 14 (London, 0. Halsted 1827) (quoting an
unidentified source).
117. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 732
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).
118. See Volokh, supra note 92, at 466-68 & nn.19-28.
i19. Professor Volokh discusses two early sources, from 1812 and 1843, that contain stray
language that could be read as confining freedom of the press to members of the profession,




hundreds of others.1 20 When the Founders spoke of the importance of "the
press," they were not talking about professional news media, but about the
printing press, meaning the ability of people to disseminate ideas easily and
inexpensively to a broad public. The licensing of the press, which was the great
evil against which the Amendment was directed, applied to books and
pamphlets as much as to newspapers.' Indeed, pamphlets were among the
most important publications for the influencing of public opinion. Thomas
Paine's Common Sense, which he self-published, is a famous example.m A 1753
essay entitled Of the Use, Abuse, and Liberty of the Press, by the future
Constitutional Convention delegate William Livingston, stated that one of the
great benefits of the printing press was that "the Press" could be used by
"Writers of every Character and Genius," including "[t]he Patriot," "[t]he
Divine," "the Philosopher, the Moralist, the Lawyer, and men of every other
Profession and Character, whose Sentiments may be diffused with the greatest
Ease and Dispatch." 3
Moreover, as Professor Volokh points out, two of the most notorious
prosecutions for abuse of the freedom of the press in the era of adoption of the
First Amendment were brought against persons who were not professional
journalists, but who nonetheless invoked the protections of freedom of the
press. " These were the Dean of St. Asaph, a clergyman who was the defendant
in a leading eighteenth-century British case on freedom of the press, and
120. 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805 (Charles S.
Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983) contains seventy-six items, originally published as
pamphlets, books, or essays in newspapers. Often, an essay was published first in a
newspaper and later as a free-standing pamphlet. Few of the works in the book were written
by printers or journalists (an exception being Benjamin Franklin). Ellis Sandoz comments
that the political pamphlets published during this time "often" were reprints of sermons.
Ellis Sandoz, Foreword to POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA 1730-1805,
at xiii (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1991).
121. Cf 8 DAVID HuME, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE INVASION OF JULIUS CAESAR TO THE
REVOLUTION IN 1688, at 332 (London, T. Cadell 1782) (noting that the power of licensure
over books was a source of tension between the Stuart royals and Parliament in the years
prior to the English Civil War).
122. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE: ADDRESSED TO THE INHABITANTS OF AMERICA (Peter Eckler
Publ'g Co. 1922) (1776).
123. Volokh, supra note 92, at 469 (quoting William Livingston, Of the Use, Abuse, and Liberty of
the Press, INDEP. REFLECTOR, Aug. 30, 1753, reprinted in THE INDEPENDENT REFLECTOR 336,
336-37 (Milton M. Klein ed., 1963)).
124. Id. at 474 n.52 (observing that freedom of the press and the associated "licentiousness of the
press" applied not only to "members of the press-as-industry" but also to "people who were
using the press-as-technology").
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Thomas Cooper, defendant in one of the most famous Sedition Act
prosecutions. Volokh has identified twelve American and three British cases
between 1784 and 1840 in which persons who were not professional journalists
explicitly invoked the freedom of the press in defense to prosecutions for libel
or similar offenses." 5 Some of these cases, importantly, involved the purchasers
of advertisements." Sometimes these non-journalists won and sometimes
they lost -but no court questioned the applicability of the freedom of the press
to their cases.127 To confine freedom of the press to professional journalism, as
the Citizens United dissenters advocated, would require shrinking-
"abridging" -the scope of the Clause, making its coverage narrower than at the
time of the Framing. This is almost unheard of in Bill of Rights jurisprudence.
3. Pragmatic Reasons
Even aside from precedent and history, there are powerful pragmatic
reasons to reject the argument that the First Amendment imparts a special
privilege to the institutional press. There is no coherent way to distinguish the
institutional press from others who disseminate information and opinion to
the public through communications media. This was a principal element of the
reasoning of the Court in Branzburg v. Hayes, rejecting a reporter's claim of a
constitutional right not to divulge confidential sources:
The administration of a constitutional newsman's privilege would
present practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order. Sooner or
later, it would be necessary to define those categories of newsmen who
qualified for the privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the
traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the lonely
pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as
of the large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest
photocomposition methods. Freedom of the press is a "fundamental
personal right" which "is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It
necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. ... The press in its historic
connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a
125. Id. at 483-98.
126. See Commonwealth v. Thomson (Bos. Mun. Ct. 1839), reprinted in REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF
DR. SAMuEL THOMSON 3-5 (Boston, Henry P. Lewis 1839); People v. Simons, 1 Wheel. Cr.
Cas. 339, 340 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1823).




vehicle of information and opinion." The informative function asserted
by representatives of the organized press in the present cases is also
performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic
researchers, and dramatists. Almost any author may quite accurately
assert that he is contributing to the flow of information to the public,
that he relies on confidential sources of information, and that these
sources will be silenced if he is forced to make disclosures before a
grand jury."2
Anyone arguing for a special constitutional right for media corporations to
engage in electioneering or editorializing must confront this difficulty.
There are two attributes of the institutional news media most commonly
said to distinguish them from other entities that merely use the press, both of
which have played a part in recent congressional legislative deliberation. First,
the news media are in the business of generating and disseminating news and
commentary-they make money from it, through subscriptions, sales, and
advertising revenue-while other speakers pay for the privilege of using the
press. For this reason, an early version of proposed "press shield" legislation in
Congress limited protection to "a person who, for financial gain or livelihood,
is engaged in journalism," along with the organizations for which the journalist
works.12 9 Second, the news media publish their materials on a regular or
periodical basis, rather than episodically. Another early version of the "press
shield" legislation thus limited its protections to those "'regularly' engage[d]"
in journalism.13o While these attributes do, more or less, distinguish the "news
media" as a matter of ordinary speech, they cannot serve to demarcate "the
press" for purposes of legal interpretation of the First Amendment.
There is no reason to believe that companies that make money on their
publications or writers who earn their living from writing have a monopoly on
the provision of the information and commentary on public affairs the Press
Clause protects. At the time of adoption of the First Amendment, it was
common for citizens of a variety of professions to use the press to express their
us. 408 U.S. 665, 703-05 (1972) (quoting Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450, 452 (1938)
and citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966)). Justice Powell's concurring opinion
appears to countenance some degree of protection for sources "where legitimate First
Amendment interests require protection." Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). But he also
joined Justice White's opinion, producing the crucial fifth vote and making it the majority.
129. H.R. 1962, 113th Cong. § 4(2) (2013).
13o. H.R. REP. No. 110-383, at 3 (2007).
439
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
views to the public.'3 ' That is even truer today, when the Internet provides a
ready platform for citizen journalists and commentators to contribute to public
discourse. Some media critics believe that the proliferation of voices has
diminished the common ground we enjoyed in the days of three homogeneous
networks,"32 but it would be odd to interpret the Press Clause, whose core
meaning is that the government may not select the authors who inform the
public, as a vehicle for reducing this diversity and imposing professional
standards as a condition of publishing to the public. Many organizations whose
primary purpose is something other than journalism -including the American
Bar Association, the National Geographic Society, the Christian Science
Church, the Smithsonian, Boy Scouts of America, and Americans United for
Separation of Church and State-also publish popular newspapers or
magazines, which surely are entitled to Press Clause protection. Indeed, in a
prominent sequel to New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court treated the
publisher for an ideological group, the John Birch Society, as a "media"
defendant.13 3 It is difficult to see why Citizens United's documentary would
have any lesser legal status.
The regular or periodical status of publications also cannot serve as a
limiting principle under the Press Clause. This would exclude not only the
lonely pamphleteer so beloved by Supreme Court opinions, but also books,
which the Court has squarely held are protected by the Press Clause.'1 4 It
would also exclude documentary films, tweets, YouTube clips, and many
blogs. It would retroactively exclude Tom Paine, Publius, and the Federal
Farmer. And such a limit would disserve the very purposes of the First
Amendment, by reducing rather than expanding the range of outlets for mass
communication.
BCRA itself exempts media corporations from its prohibition of
editorializing during the campaign season. This may reflect Congress's view
that such an exception is necessary under the Press Clause, or it may reflect the
political power of media corporations. BCRA defines the media exception as
follows: "The term 'expenditure' does not include-any news story,
131. See supra notes 120-126 and accompanying text.
132. See CAsS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001); Markus Prior, News vs. Entertainment: How
Increasing Media Choice Widens Gaps in Political Knowledge and Turnout, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI.
577 (2005)-
133. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 325, 347 (1974).
134. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 65 n.6 (1963) ("The constitutional guarantee of




commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting
station, newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, unless such
facilities are owned or controlled by any political party, political committee, or
candidate."135 The exception rescues only broadcast stations, magazines,
newspapers, and other periodical publications. It does not apply to books or
pamphlets, as counsel for the United States admitted, or to the Internet, to
films, to handbills, or to other non-periodical communications. Even if the
Press Clause extends protection only to the institutional "press," this definition
is surely underinclusive. It would be subject to an as-applied challenge by
entities constitutionally entitled to protection under the Press Clause but not
included within the statutory definition. If the Press Clause refers instead to
the right of any person to use the technology of the press to disseminate
opinions - as history and precedent indicate - this provision of BCRA is facially
unconstitutional, because everyone has a constitutional right to publish their
views about officials and candidates during the election season.
Congress has more recently confronted the difficulties of defining "the
press" in its consideration of legislation to shield the press from forced
disclosures of sources and other investigative materials.13' To be sure, the
problem in that context is not identical to the problem in the campaign speech
context. Press shield legislation would expand protection beyond that required
by the First Amendment, while restrictions on the publication of opinions
about candidates for office would shrink it. When expanding protection,
legislatures are entitled to draw lines that might not be permissible in the case
of abridgements.
The substance is different in the two contexts, as well. Press shield laws
focus on the newsgathering function, while the campaign context relates to
publication of opinion. Definitions crafted for the former purpose are unlikely
to be apt for the latter. Nonetheless, the difficulties encountered in drafting a
definition of "press" for press shield purposes are suggestive.
A bill passed by the Senate Judiciary Committee in September 2013 would
protect a person who "regularly gathers, prepares, collects, photographs,
records, writes, edits, reports or publishes" any "news or information
concerning local, national, or international events or other matters of public
135. 2 U.S.C. § 4 3 1(9)(B)(i) (2012).
136. See HENRY COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL328o6, JOURNALISTS' PRIVILEGE TO
WITHHOLD INFORMATION IN JUDICIAL AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS: STATE SHIELD STATUTES
(2007); KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL34193, JOURNALISTS' PRIVILEGE:
OVERVIEW OF THE LAW AND LEGISLATION IN RECENT CONGRESSES (2011).
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interest," with exceptions related to foreign governments and terrorism. 37
Some congressmen advocated limiting protection to persons who are "engaged
in journalism" for "financial gain or livelihood."'3' These versions reflect the
two commonsensical definitions of the institutional press that we have already
rejected as constitutional limits: financial gain and regularity.139 Both arouse
opposition, either for being too broad or for being too narrow. Because press
shield legislation would extend immunities to the press beyond what the First
Amendment has been held to require, it probably does not violate the
Constitution to confine those immunities to a subset of entities entitled to
protection under the Press Clause.4o In the context of editorializing about
candidates, however, a narrow definition would abridge constitutional liberty.
Any law limiting the right of editorializing to paid professionals or "regular"
journalists would amount to licensing.
Congress is not the only institution struggling with how to define the
press. In a recent opinion, the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon put forward a multi-factor test to distinguish news media
organizations from others.141 The case, a defamation suit, involved a self-styled
"investigative blogger."' 2 The court held that the outcome depended in part on
whether the blogger was a "media defendant" or "journalist" for purposes of
First Amendment protection under Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.143 The court
concluded "no," providing the following analysis:
137. Free Flow of Information Act of 2013, S. 987, 1 3th Cong. § 11(2)(A).
138. Free Flow of Information Act of 2013, H.R. 1962, 113th Cong. § 4(2).
139. See supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text.
14o. It might be argued under the majority's approach in Citizens United that it is
unconstitutional to draw lines among potential speakers or publishers, but I regard this as
an overreading. Extension of benefits is not the same, constitutionally, as restriction of
rights.
141. Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, No. CV-11- 5 7-HZ, 2011 WL 5999334 (D. Or. Nov. 30,
2011). The decision is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
142. Id. at *5.
143. Id. at *5, *7. See 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). Lower courts have split over whether the Gertz
holding applies to non-media defendants. Compare Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 350 A.2d
688, 695 (Md. 1976) ("[T]he Gertz holding should apply to media and non-media
defendants -alike. . . ."), with Denny v. Mertz, 318 N.W.2d 141, 153 (Wis. 1982) ("[W]e do
not read Gertz as requiring that the protections provided therein apply to non-media





Defendant fails to bring forth any evidence suggestive of her status as a
journalist. For example, there is no evidence of (1) any education in
journalism; (2) any credentials or proof of any affiliation with any
recognized news entity; (3) proof of adherence to journalistic standards
such as editing, fact-checking, or disclosures of conflicts of interest; (4)
keeping notes of conversations and interviews conducted; (5) mutual
understanding or agreement of confidentiality between the defendant
and his/her sources; (6) creation of an independent product rather than
assembling writings and postings of others; or (7) contacting "the other
side" to get both sides of a story. Without evidence of this nature,
defendant is not "media."44
Presumably, a similar test could be used to determine whether the Press Clause
protects the blogger's right to blog about the virtues or flaws of a candidate
for office.
The definition, though, is deeply inconsistent with the idea of freedom of
the press. To require "education in journalism," credentials, and proof of
adherence to professional standards is essentially to require a license. The Press
Clause forbids that. To exclude publishers of material created by others would
render the advertisement at issue in New York Times v. Sullivan -which was
written by a group of ministers and civil rights leaders - outside the protection
of the Clause. It was common for newspapers at the time of the Founding to
publish material from a variety of sources, such as The Federalist essays and
their Anti-Federalist counterparts. Reader's Digest would seem to be within the
category of "news media," but it does not generate its own content. Moreover,
whether the writer keeps notes of conversations and enters into agreements of
confidentiality with sources is not applicable to opinion journalism. As to
"contacting 'the other side,"' this suggests that -biased or opinionated
journalism is not constitutionally protected. Who is to be the judge of that?
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press put forward a simpler
definition of the press in its amicus brief in Citizens United: "entities that have
the intent to gather and disseminate news, commentary and other
information. 1 4s It is not evident who this definition excludes, beyond those
144. Obsidian Finance, 2011 WL 5999334, at *5.
145. Supplemental Brief for the Reporters Committee, supra note 43, at 12. This definition
appears to have been incorporated from the Committee's proposals for "press
shield" legislation, without attention to the potential difference in context. E.g., Comments
on Proposed Assembly Bill 333 Establishing a Privilege for Reporters and Whistleblowers,
REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 4-5 (July 21, 2009), http://www.rcfp.org
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who acquire information before they decide to write about it-a limitation
relevant to the "press shield" issue but not to the right to editorialize.
Presumably, every "entity" that pays for advertising praising or attacking a
candidate "intends" to disseminate "commentary." Citizens United, for
example, prepared a documentary, which was an extended negative
commentary on then-Senator Clinton. Is that outside the definition? If "the
press" is given a functional definition, as it should be, then any entity that
performs the function of writing and disseminating news and opinion is part of
it. Read literally, the Reporters Committee definition encompasses the Citizens
United movie; indeed it encompasses standard television campaign ads by
independent groups. Whatever else might be said of these, they contain
"commentary" and "other information." This definition thus supports, rather
than undermines, the Citizens United ruling.
The Reporters Committee's definition, interestingly, does not limit "the
press" to entities that make money, or intend to make money, from their
publications, or to periodicals, or to entities that engage in publishing on a
regular basis. Apparently the Committee recognized that amateurs and
occasional participants have the same rights as professionals and full-timers.
It is possible, though unlikely, that the Reporters Committee is using the
words "news, commentary, and other information" in some sort of normative
journalistic sense, meaning responsible and objective news, commentary, and
other information.46 If so, the definition puts the courts in the business of
/news/documents/2oo90724-commentsonproposedwisconsinshieldlaw.pdf (arguing that
"the proper test to apply is whether the newsperson had the intent to gather and
disseminate news to the public at the inception of the reporting process"); Letter from the
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press to John Ashcroft, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Jan. 14,
2002), http://www.rcfp.org/news/documents/2oo2o114Leggett.pdf (arguing the same).
146. In deliberations over proposed "press shield" legislation in Congress, one congressman
expressed concern that "protections for the mainstream press" should not be "so broad" as
to "extend to tabloids that thrive on gossip and misinformation." Free Flow ofInformation Act
of 2oo7: Hearing on H.R. 212o Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, noth Cong. 1o (2007)
(statement of Rep. Lamar Smith, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary); see also 155
CONG. REC. H42o7 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 2009) (statement of Rep. Steve King, Member, H.
Comm. on the Judiciary) (insisting on a certain "level of professionalism" to warrant
protection). It is perhaps worth noting that even "tabloids" and amateurs can perform the
function of informing the public, sometimes more courageously than the mainstream press,
as one former major party candidate for Vice President of the United States learned to
his regret. See Howard Kurtz, Inquiding Minds Want to Know: Can a Tabloid Win a
Pulitzer?, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 201o, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2olo-ol-22/news




judging journalistic quality, which the prohibition on press licensing would
seem to forbid. Surely Hillary: The Movie did not forfeit constitutional
protection because it was so one-sided. Not a few undoubted organs of the
news media would be endangered under that criterion.
The New York Times editorial board recently ran an editorial responding to
a speech by Justice Samuel Alito in which the Justice pointed out that
"corporations have free speech rights and that, without such rights,
newspapers would have lost the major press freedom rulings that allowed the
publication of the Pentagon Papers and made it easier for newspapers to
defend themselves against libel suits in New York Times v. Sullivan."47 The
editorialists called the argument "specious[]," explaining that
[i]t is not the corporate structure of media companies that makes them
deserving of constitutional protection. It is their function -the vital role
that the press plays in American democracy -that sets them apart. . . .
The Citizens United majority never explained why any corporation that
does not have a press function warrants the same free speech rights as a
person. 48
But it is precisely the "function" of preparing and disseminating a documentary
containing commentary on a matter of public concern that the Court's decision
protected. The Court did not hold that Citizens United was protected because it
was a corporation, but-following the same logic as the New York Times
editorial-the Court held Citizens United was protected notwithstanding its
corporate structure. The editorialists do not explain in what sense the
"function" of preparing and disseminating a documentary differs from their
own activity-unless they think their full-time professional positions set them
apart from other Americans who wish to comment on public affairs.
It bears mention that if no coherent distinction can be drawn between the
institutional press and other persons who wish to disseminate information and
opinion to the public, the effort to amend the Constitution to reverse the
Citizens United decision is misguided. The principle at the heart of Citizens
United, understood as freedom of the press, is not merely an artifact of the
positive law of text, history, and precedent, but is a natural implication of the
underlying liberty. We cannot overrule Citizens United by constitutional
Inquirer broke the story of Democratic Party Vice Presidential nominee John Edwards's
adulterous affair).
147. Editorial, supra note 38. The quotation is from the editorial, not from the Justice.
148. Id.
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amendment without either endangering the right of the press to editorialize or
drawing a line for the first time between a privileged class of recognized
journalists who enjoy the freedom to publish, and the rest of us who do not.
In conclusion, if the freedom of the press includes the right to publish
criticism or praise of a candidate in the days or weeks prior to an election (as it
does), and if corporations, including for-profit corporations like the New York
Times Company, can exercise the freedom of the press (as they can), and if
there is no basis in history, precedent, or logic for distinguishing between the
institutional press and other persons or groups who wish to publish their
opinions about candidates for public office, the result-even if not the
reasoning-of Citizens United has to be correct. Under this approach to the
case, it was not necessary for the Justices on both sides of the issue to delve into
dubious quasi-empirical inquiries relating to the prevention of corruption, the
protection of stockholders, or leveling the playing field, since none of those
concerns overrides the right of the press to editorialize. As the Court said in its
concluding sentence in Mills: " [N]o test of reasonableness can save a state law
from invalidation as a violation of the First Amendment when that law makes
it a crime for a newspaper editor to do no more than urge people to vote one
way or another in a publicly held election."4 9
II. THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS DOES NOT PROTECT THE RIGHT OF
ANYONE TO MAKE CONTRIBUTIONS TO CAMPAIGNS
One implication of this way of analyzing Citizens United is that it
establishes only the right of an entity under the Press Clause to publish or
disseminate opinions about officials and candidates for office. It says nothing
about the right to contribute to candidates, political parties, or PACs. The right
to publish belongs to everyone -to natural persons like Thomas Paine, to for-
profit corporations like the New York Times Company, and to non-media
corporations like Citizens United-but contributing to candidates is not an
exercise of the freedom of the press. For purposes of this essay, I take no
position on how to classify contributions as a First Amendment matter.
Contributing to candidates may be an exercise of the freedom of expressive
association; it may be an instance of expressive conduct; it may be the use of a
thing for expressive purposes. Limitations on contributions may be a "direct"
limitation on the communication of a message, triggering strict scrutiny under
149. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 220 (1966).
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the Speech Clause, or something less. But contributing to a candidate is not the
use of "the press"-or modern technological advances on "the press"- to
disseminate news and opinion to the public. It therefore falls outside the
Press Clause.
A. Contrasting the Press Clause Approach to the Majority's Prohibition on
Speaker-Based Distinctions
This Press Clause approach to Citizens United has the judicial minimalist
virtue of not deciding, in one massive proceeding, the full range of campaign
finance constitutional issues. It would permit the Court to grapple with the
questions of contributions and contribution disclosure requirements on their
own terms. Those issues, properly understood, involve separate free speech
and association doctrines far afield from the Press Clause. Of course, if the
Court were to conclude that restrictions on campaign contributions are a direct
and significant abridgement of freedom of speech, which some Justices and
many scholars have argued, any distinction between contributions and
expenditures, or between freedom of speech and freedom of the press, would
largely dissolve. But, it is possible that the Court could reaffirm contribution
limits under the theory that, as exercises of expressive conduct or expressive
association, they are entitled to less than strict scrutiny, even while recognizing
that independent expenditures taking the form of broadcast editorials are
protected under the Press Clause. For better or worse, that would essentially
maintain something close to the doctrinal status quo with respect to
contribution limits. The Press Clause approach I have set forth here is
compatible with either alternative.
The majority's opinion, by contrast, rested on the broad proposition that
"restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some
but not others" are "[p]rohibited."' 50 In other words, speech-restrictive laws
discriminating on the basis of speaker identity are suspect, just as laws
discriminating on the basis of content or viewpoint are suspect. This
proposition is plausible and even attractive within a certain domain, but it is
newly minted and seems overbroad.
1so. 558 U.S. at 34o; see also id. at 394 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("The basic premise underlying the Court's ruling is its iteration, and constant reiteration,
of the proposition that the First Amendment bars regulatory distinctions based on a
speaker's identity, including its 'identity' as a corporation.").
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According to the Court, Buckley and Bellotti established the "principle" that
"the Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the
speaker's corporate identity."'15 In my opinion, that is not quite correct. Bellotti
(and to a lesser extent Buckley) held that corporations, no less than individuals,
have certain rights to participate in campaigns.52 But this conclusion did not
rest on the illegitimacy of the distinction between corporations and individuals.
It rested on the right of corporations, among others, to exercise First
Amendment rights and the inadequacy of the government's justifications for
attempting to abridge that right. In other words, "corporate identity" was not a
sufficient constitutional justification to "suppress political speech."s15 This is
not the same as holding that the very distinction between corporations and
individuals with respect to speech demands strict scrutiny.
In its Speech Clause decisions, the Court has been vigilant to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of viewpoint and sometimes subject matter,'54 but
has never before placed speaker-based discrimination in the same suspect
category. In the campaign finance context, the Court has distinguished
between non-profit and for-profit groups,ss and between foreign nationals and
U.S. citizens,'5' without any Justice suggesting that restrictions based on
speaker identity were suspect. The Court has upheld laws forbidding federal
employees from engaging in electioneering, which is a form of speech at the
heart of the First Amendment,157 and laws limiting the use of university
classrooms to student groups.ss Labor laws impose restrictions on the right of
employers to speak that do not apply to unions.159 Applying the rational basis
151. Id. at 365 (majority opinion).
152. First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782&n.18 (1978).
153. See id. at 784-86 (noting that the Massachusetts law at issue "single[d] out a specific kind of
ballot question- individual taxation-about which corporations could never make their
ideas public"). This language suggests that the Court may have viewed the law as a content-
based regulation.
154. E.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Police Dep't of
Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
155. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
156. Bluman v. FEC, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012) (per curiam).
157. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
158. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2986 (2010).
1s. For an employer to express the view that unionization would have bad consequences for
workers is often treated as retaliatory or coercive speech. See Paul D. Snitzer, Employer Free




test, the Court unanimously upheld a tax rule allowing veterans groups to
lobby, but not other groups entitled to receive tax-deductible contributions. 0
The public forum doctrine conspicuously forbids restrictions based on
viewpoint, but not on speaker identity.' It may be possible to reconcile some
of these results with a prohibition on speaker-based restrictions, and some of
them may be wrongly decided, but the analytical path is not straightforward.
The Supreme Court's intuition that speaker-based restrictions are out of
place in the context of Citizens United is better explained as a construction of
the Press Clause, where the principle would be confined to the specific
question of who is permitted to disseminate information and opinion to the
public through media of mass communication. The heart of the Press Clause is
its prohibition on licensing; another way to express the prohibition on
licensing is that the government may not pick and choose who can publish.
The Speech Clause, by contrast, is focused on the dangers of regulating on the
basis of the content or communicative impact of the message. The Speech
Clause comprises a variety of doctrines such as public forum, expressive
conduct, time-place-and-manner restrictions, public employee speech, and
neutrality in access to subsidies, which have not traditionally been thought to
preclude all speaker-based distinctions.
A prohibition on all speaker-based discrimination would seem to render
unconstitutional BCRA's provision barring corporations and unions, but not
individuals or other forms of associations, from making contributions to
political campaigns - a restriction going back more than a hundred years' and
upheld as recently as FEC v. Beaumont in 2003. 13 If the Court has been correct
to treat restrictions on contributions as restrictions on speech-albeit
"marginal"' 64-and if the government may not "allow[] speech by some but
not others,""'6 it would seem to follow that it is unconstitutional for Congress
or the states to allow contributions by individuals and not by corporations and
labor unions. To be sure, every court of appeals confronted with this post-
16o. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 54o (1983).
161. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (allowing one union,
but not another, to disseminate materials within a school).
162. Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2012)).
163. 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
164. Id. at 161 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam)).
165. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
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Citizens United challenge to the corporate contribution ban has rejected it,' 66
but it is hard to square Citizens United's broad speaker-equality rationale with
any such restrictions. The lower courts sustain these restrictions not by a
logical distinction from Citizens United but because Beaumont is the precedent
most closely on point.16 Again, the conclusion that prohibitions on corporate
campaign contributions are laws abridging the freedom of speech may be
correct-Justices Scalia and Thomas have made serious arguments to that
effect -but it was not necessary for Citizens United to reopen that issue.
B. Contributions, Expenditures, and Publications
The distinction between contributions and independent expenditures has
been central to the logic (or illogic) of campaign finance law since Buckley v.
Valeo."' According to the Beaumont Court's reading of Buckley, limits on
campaign contributions are "merely 'marginal' speech restrictions subject to
relatively complaisant review under the First Amendment,""6 9 while limits on
independent expenditures are more "direct restraint[s]" on speech.17o This
distinction, rather than any of the details of the regulatory schemes, explains
the results of the Court's campaign finance cases. In every case but one,'71 the
166. See, e.g., Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3 d 864 (8th Cir. 2012)
(en banc); United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F. 3d 611, 615-19 (4th Cir. 2012); Ognibene v.
Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 183-84 (2d Cir. 2011); Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1o9,
1124-26 ( 9th Cir. 2011); Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 202-07 (2d
Cir. 2010).
167. Swanson, 692 F.3d at 879 ("Rightly or wrongly decided, Beaumont dictates the level of
scrutiny and the potential legitimacy of the interests Minnesota advances by prohibiting
corporate contributions to political candidates and committees." (footnote omitted));
Danielczyk, 683 F.3d at 615 ("Beaumont clearly supports the constitutionality of §441b(a) and
Citizens United, a case that addresses corporate independent expenditures, does not
undermine Beaumont's reasoning on this point."); Ognibene, 671 F. 3d at 183 ("Contrary to
Appellants' exhortations, however, Citizens United applies only to independent corporate
expenditures. It reaffirms existing precedent on the propriety of contribution limits."); id. at
194-95 (applying Beaumont); Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1124-26 (discussing Beaumont);
Garfield, 616 F.3d at 198-99 (applying Beaumont).
168. 424 U.S. 1.
16q. FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161 (2003) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at i).
170. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.




Court has upheld restrictions on contributions"7 while it invariably invalidates
restrictions on independent expenditures. 7  This rough-and-ready
compromise, which pleases no one, has lasted more than thirty-five years.
The Buckley Court put forward two reasons for the sharp distinction
between contributions and independent expenditures, one based on the impact
of the regulation on the speaker and the other on the governmental interest.
Neither is persuasive. According to the Court, contribution limits impose no
significant restraint on speech rights because "l[t] he quantity of communication
by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his
contribution, since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic
act of contributing." 174 This is absurd. Of course, more money buys more
speech, more airtime, more messages, more staff to call more voters, more
everything. It may well be true that the marginal impact of more spending at
the high end is exiguous, but neither candidates nor donors apparently think
their efforts have reached that ceiling.
To say that contribution limits impose no significant restraint on speech is
like saying that a fifteen-minute limitation on labor picketing would be fine, on
the theory that once the picketer has engaged in the "symbolic act of picketing"
there is no point in keeping it up. Contributing to a campaign is not a binary
show of allegiance like putting a bumper sticker on your car. The point of a
contribution is to enable the campaign to purchase more advertising. The
expressive element is not the mere act of contributing; most often, no one else
knows about the contribution unless they look the contributor up on
OpenSecrets.org. The point of the contribution is to enable one's candidate to
purchase more advertising, and caps on contributions plainly limit that.
On the governmental interest side, the Buckley Court hypothesized that
"the independent advocacy restricted by the provision does not presently
appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those
identified with large campaign contributions."75 That was a dubious claim at
the time of Buckley, and is even harder to believe today.
172. E.g., Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146; Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); Cal.
Med. Ass'n. v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
173. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996); FEC v. Nat'1
Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470 U.S. 48o (1985); First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1978).
174. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
175. Id. at 46.
451
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The district court in McConnell heard compelling testimony from
participants in campaigns to the effect that independent expenditures are well
known to the candidates and have much the same impact on them as direct
contributions. Judge Kollar-Kotelly made the following factual finding:
The factual findings of the Court illustrate that corporations and labor
unions routinely notify Members of Congress as soon as they air
electioneering communications relevant to the Members' elections. The
record also indicates that Members express appreciation to
organizations for the airing of these election-related advertisements.
Indeed, Members of Congress are particularly grateful when negative
issue advertisements are run by these organizations, leaving the
candidates free to run positive advertisements and be seen as "above the
fray." Political consultants testify that campaigns are quite aware of
who is running advertisements on the candidate's behalf, when they are
being run, and where they are being run.176
This finding does not support a distinction between corporations and other
donors, but it does cast doubt on the Buckley Court's empirical speculation that
independent expenditures, unlike contributions, are non-corrupting.
Indeed, in some ways independent expenditures may be more corrupting
than direct contributions to candidates' campaigns or political parties.
Typically, the "independent" campaign groups are organized and led by close
associates of the candidate, often former campaign officials or aides. Even
without "coordinating" their efforts with the campaign, they can make known
to the candidate who is writing checks. And often, contributions to these
organizations need not be publicly disclosed. That means that the candidate
knows who is supporting him-but no one else does. The law may have
created the worst of both worlds -at least contributions to the candidate or the
political party are disclosed.
The Citizens United majority was therefore wrong, in my opinion, to
embrace and perpetuate the Buckley Court's admittedly provisional argument
("independent advocacy . . . does not presently appear to pose dangers . . .") on
this point.'7 The Court's reliance on this rationale made the Citizens United
decision appear naive or obtuse.
176. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 623 (D.D.C. 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted), affd in part and revd in part, 54o U.S. 93
(2003).




C. Significance ofthe Press Clause
The Press Clause, by contrast, provides a coherent basis for distinguishing
between contributions and at least some independent expenditures- those
taking the form of published advocacy for or against a candidate. Such
expenditures are an exercise of freedom of the press; contributions to a
candidate, a campaign, or a party are not. To be sure, the line between press
and contributor does not perfectly track Buckley's line between independent
expenditures and contributions. Some forms of independent expenditure do
not constitute publishing one's opinions to the public-for example, paying for
legal expenses or opposition research, financing computer systems for the
analysis of data, or hiring buses to get voters to the polls. Reportedly,
billionaire George Soros contributed $5 million during the last election cycle to
research and develop new ways to get Democratic-leaning voting groups to the
polls.17' Expenditures of this sort are not exercises of the freedom of the press,
and there is no apparent reason why they should not be as regulated (or
unregulated) as contributions to candidates.
Other activities now defined as being on the "independent expenditure"
side of the Buckley line may not be exercises of the freedom of the press. For
example, in SpeechNow.org v. FEC,79 the D.C. Circuit held that contributions
to non-profit organizations that make independent expenditures in support of
candidates cannot be subject to contribution limits or disclosure requirements.
(This decision, far more than Citizens United, is responsible for recent erosions
of limits on campaign money.) If the proper line is between contributions to
candidates and independent expenditures, this decision is a logical extension of
Buckley. But contributions to PACs are no more an exercise of the freedom of
the press than contributions to candidates. Persons may pool their money to
buy advertisements, as in Sullivan, and remain within the contours of press
freedom, but when they give money to others with no control over the
178. See Ernest Istook, Liberal Stealth Groups Paved Obama Win, FOUNDRY (Nov. 29, 2012,
10:30 AM), http://blog.heritage.org/2012/1/29Aiberal-stealth-groups-paved-obama-win.
Independent expenditures of this sort would presumably not be protected by freedom of the
press. Nor, however, do they come within the statutory prohibitions of BCRA, even though
they are known to the candidates and no doubt are appreciated by them, and thus raise the
same dangers of corruption that are presented by electioneering expenditures. BCRA would
appear to be underinclusive from the point of view of the anti-corruption rationale,
targeting only those forms of independent expenditure that involve public commentary.
179. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2olo).
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messages that will be purchased, it would stretch the definition to say they
were engaged in the function of the "press."
Nonetheless, the vast majority of independent expenditures fall squarely
within the definition of freedom of the press as they constitute the
dissemination of opinion or information to the public through media or
communications. The distinction drawn in Buckley between expenditures and
contributions is difficult to justify under freedom of speech principles, but
loosely tracks the contours of freedom of the press.
Even apart from the formal textual argument-that producing and
distributing a documentary like the one in Citizens United is an exercise of
freedom of the press, while giving money to a campaign is not-an approach
based on the Press Clause also has functional appeal. It roughly tracks the
distinction between attempts to persuade the public, which are and should be
constitutionally protected, and attempts to make officeholders grateful, which are
not (or the flip side, attempts by officeholders to extract money from those
they regulate, which are likewise not protected). Americans have a First
Amendment right to do what we can to sway public opinion, but not to buy
privileged access to our leaders by giving money to their campaigns. Reliance
on the Press Clause is thus a first step toward aligning legal doctrine with the
underlying purposes of the First Amendment.
Professor Lawrence Lessig has recently made a similar point, though
without reference to the Press Clause. He argues that contributions to
candidates (and probably also to super PACs) produce the kind of officeholder
"dependence" that the Framers would have labeled "corruption," but that
direct expenditures like those involved in Citizens United, even by corporations,
"have their effect by affecting how people view political contests" and are
properly protected by the First Amendment."so On this ground, he says that
Citizens United "might be correct.""' The difference between his argument and
mine is that he focuses on whether there is a compelling interest supporting
speech regulation, while I focus on whether independent advocacy is protected
under the Press Clause.
iso. Lawrence Lessig, What an 'Originalist' Would Understand 'Corruption' to Mean: The 2013
Jorde Lecture, 102 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 27, 30), http://
ssm.com/abstract=2257948.




D. Perverse Consequences ofthe Contribution-Expenditure Distinction
While reliance on the Press Clause as the basis for protecting the
publication of commentary about candidates would shore up something close
to the Buckley line as a matter of constitutional doctrine, it would not make that
line any less perverse as a practical matter. Allowing unlimited expenditures by
candidates while restricting contributions to relatively small increments has
three pernicious consequences. First, it gives an unfair advantage to two types
of candidates, incumbents and rich people, while disadvantaging non-rich
challengers. Running for office is expensive, and raising money is expensive.
Challengers will find it hard to raise sufficient funds from large numbers of
small contributors. Their best hope -wealthy supporters with an ideological
interest in their candidacy -is cut off. Incumbents, by contrast, can tap into
networks of lobbyists and others whose economic interests are affected by their
public actions, starting with a fundraising reception the day after they win
office, and wealthy individuals (so-called "self-funders") can write a check to
their own campaign to get it started.
Second, this combination of rules has the effect of driving money away
from candidates and political parties, which are the most accountable entities
to the public, and toward special interest groups and faceless organizations,
which are less so. Candidates and parties are at least somewhat inclined to
avoid the extremes, and may pay a price if their ads are overly harsh and
negative. Special interest groups and super PACs are less likely to feel these
constraints. As Judge Kollar-Kotelly found as a fact, based on the record in the
D.C. District Court in McConnell, candidates are "grateful" when independent
groups take on the burden of running the negative ads, because it enables them
to appear to be "above the fray. "1 I am skeptical of any governmental effort to
police campaign speech to make it less negative, vitriolic, or immoderate, but
there is little to be said for laws that exacerbate these vices. Why magnify the
voices that are most likely to debase the debate?
The Buckley decision has thus done great damage to the nation's political
life, by advantaging incumbents and self-funders, weakening candidates and
political parties, and magnifying the voices of faceless political organizations
and special interest groups. This was not the law Congress passed. If
expenditure limits were low or contribution limits high, these effects would not
be so pronounced.
182. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 623 (D.D.C. 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), affd in part and rev'd inpart, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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Quite apart from its constitutional holdings, the Buckley Court may be
criticized for its severability analysis. When a court strikes down part, but not
all, of a statute, its duty is to allow the partial statute to go into effect only if
this would effectuate likely congressional intent.81 It is almost impossible to
imagine that a rational public-interested Congress would have enacted a
campaign reform statute in this perverse form. Very few people on either side
of the campaign finance controversy think that the combination of contribution
limits and no expenditure limits is wise public policy. The Court should not
have imputed that intent to Congress, but should have struck the entire statute
and allowed Congress to decide what mix of policies to enact.
The distinction between contributions and expenditures survives in the
Supreme Court only because the two sides of the debate are at odds about how
to resolve it. At least six of the justices now condemn the distinction between
contributions and expenditures, but one wing of the Court (Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas) would erase the distinction by extending constitutional
protection to contributions,"* and the other (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor,
and Kagan) would erase the distinction by stripping constitutional protection
from independent expenditures.8 s This produces a standoff. Together, these
coalitions comprise a majority for the proposition that the distinction between
contributions and expenditures should be abandoned, but they cancel each
other out, leaving a durable plurality in support of a distinction that at most
two of the Justices (Roberts and Alito), and perhaps not all of those, are
willing to defend.
183. See Nat'l Fed. Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (striking down the Medicaid
expansion but allowing the statute to go into effect on a voluntary basis); United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (striking down the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines but
allowing the statute to remain in effect subject to district court departures).
184. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 409-10 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(stating that he would "overrule" Buckley and suggesting that he would extend protection to
contributions, or at least defer to legislatures to come up with such limits); id. at 410
(Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.) (stating that he would "overrule" Buckley and
"subject campaign contribution limitations to strict scrutiny").
185. All three Justices joined Justice Breyer's dissent in American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock,
which claimed that independent expenditures could be as corrupting as direct contributions.
132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491-92 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
186. In Randall v. Sorrell, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer declined to revisit Buckley on
stare decisis grounds. 548 U.S. 230, 242-44 (2006) (plurality opinion). Justice Alito refused
to join that portion of the plurality opinion because the respondents had not briefed the
issue. Id. at 263-64 (Alito, J., concurring). Since Randall, Justice Breyer has dissented in




As a constitutional doctrinal matter, recognition of the Press Clause
underpinnings to the expenditure side of this mess will not force
reconsideration on the contribution side, but it could affect the Court's
thinking about contributions in a more indirect way. As we have seen, the Press
Clause offers a sounder doctrinal basis for distinguishing between
contributions and (most) expenditures, and thus seems to shore up something
close to the Buckley distinction. But if it becomes clear that the Court cannot
sanction abridgement of the right to publish opinions about public officials and
candidates - as the analysis in Part I indicates - then the pro-reform wing of
the Court is going to have to engage in a difficult calculus. As a policy matter,
they favor restrictions on both contributions and expenditures. But if
restrictions on independent expenditures in the form of publication of opinions
about candidates are impossible to square with fundamental principles of
freedom of press, reform-minded Justices have to decide whether contribution
limits alone do more harm than good. Under anything stronger than rational
basis scrutiny, contribution limits can be sustained only if they can be proven
to contribute substantially to achievement of an important governmental
purpose, according to the verbal formula of intermediate scrutiny. I think it is
manifest that contribution limits without independent expenditure limits do
not accomplish their intended purpose; on the contrary, they magnify the
influence of incumbents, wealthy candidates, special interests, and
unaccountable groups at the expense of challengers, candidates, and parties.
The current regime does not stanch the flow of money into politics, with its
attendant corruption and extortionate effects, but only channels the money
away from candidates and parties toward super PACs and single-issue
ideological organizations, which are worse.
If it is not possible to prohibit the publication of commentary on candidates
without violating established principles under the Press Clause, then it is not
constitutionally possible to resolve the Buckley distinction by eliminating
protection for independent expenditures on political advocacy. Supporters of
campaign finance regulation may be forced to look for alternative ways to
improve our dysfunctional system. These likely involve raising contribution
limits, reviving political parties, simplifying and speeding up the enforcement
process, and facilitating relatively small but numerous contributions by means
such as tax credits. Citizens United does not, in itself, conflict with Buckley, but
it exposes the dysfunctional dynamic at the heart of Buckley's distinction
between contributions and expenditures. If a proper understanding of the
Citizens United problem serves to disabuse reform advocates of the futile hope
of having all they wish, maybe it will inspire them to move toward solutions of
more pragmatic value to the democratic process.
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CONCLUSION
Citizens United is a highly controversial, indeed reviled, decision, but it
should not be. If the case had been analyzed under the Press Clause, the
outcome of the case would have hinged on the doctrinal question whether the
Press Clause protects the publication of commentary about public figures by
entities that are not part of the journalism profession, as it already
uncontroversially protects such commentary by the institutional press. No one
doubts that media corporations like the New York Times Company have a
constitutional right to publish critiques of candidates for office during the
election campaign season. The proper question for the Court in Citizens United
was whether this undoubted right extends to non-media groups like Citizens
United. I have argued that precedent and history strongly support the principle
that the freedom of the press extends to all who wish to use media of mass
communications to express news and opinion to the public, whether they are
professional journalists or not, and that the attempt to define a privileged
subclass of protected media is both practically impossible and contrary to the
anti-licensing logic of the Press Clause. If that is so, the result -though not the
analysis - of Citizens United is correct.
If we approach these issues from the standpoint of the Press Clause, the
question resolved in Citizens United need not disturb the jurisprudence of
campaign finance restrictions on contributions. Indeed, a Press Clause analysis
provides a sounder doctrinal basis for something close to the holding ofBuckley
v. Valeo than Buckley itself articulated. As a practical matter, though, once we
recognize that the Press Clause does not permit Congress or the states to
abridge the right of anyone to publish commentary on candidates for public
office during an election campaign season, reformers might well conclude that
the Buckley regime of contribution limits without expenditure controls does
more harm than good. The correctness of Citizens United should be a spur to
thinking about what real campaign finance reform would look like.
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